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The Charlottetown Accord of 1992 was a set of proposals for amendments to the Constitution of Canada.
These proposals were designed to achieve a national settlement of a variety of constitutional grievances,
chiefly those arising from Quebec nationalism, western regionalism, and Aboriginal deprivation. The
Accord was defeated in a national referendum. In the case of Quebec, the defeat of the Charlottetown
Accord, following as it did on the defeat of the Meech Lake Accord, has made the option of secession
relatively more attractive, but there are sound pragmatic reasons to hope that Quebec will not make that
choice. In the case of the West, there is evidence that the westward movement of wealth and political
power is resolving regional grievances without the need for constitutional amendment. In the case of the
Aboriginal peoples, the settlement of their land claims and their progress towards self-government can
proceed under the existing Constitution. Thus the failure of comprehensive constitutional reform should
not preclude Canada from managing the tensions that the reform movement was designed to resolve.
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THE DIFFICULTY OF AMENDING
THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA©
By PETER W. HOGG*
The Charlottetown Accord of 1992 was a set of proposals for amendments to
the Constitution of Canada. These proposals were designed to achieve a
national settlement of a variety of constitutional grievances, chiefly those
arising from Quebec nationalism, western regionalism, and Aboriginal
deprivation. The Accord was defeated in a national referendum. In the case
of Quebec, the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord, following as it did on the
defeat of the Meech Lake Accord, has made the option of secession relatively
more attractive, but there are sound pragmatic reasons to hope that Quebec
will not make that choice. In the case of the West, there is evidence that the
westward movement of wealth and political power is resolving regional
grievances without the need for constitutional amendment. In the case of the
Aboriginal peoples, the settlement of their land claims and their progress
towards self-government can proceed under the existing Constitution. Thus
the failure of comprehensive constitutional reform should not preclude
Canada from managing the tensions that the reform movement was designed
to resolve.
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I. THE NATIONAL REFERENDUM

In a national referendum held on 26 October 1992,1 the people
of Canada answered no to the question they were asked. The question
was, "Do you agree that the Constitution of Canada should be renewed
on the basis of the agreement reached on August 28, 1992?"2 The
agreement reached on 28 August 1992 was the Charlottetown Accord,
which was an agreement on a set of proposals for the amendment of the
Constitution of Canada that had been reached by the Prime Minister,
the ten provincial Premiers, the two territorial leaders, and the leaders
3
of four national Aboriginal organizations.
A popular referendum is not of course part of the legal
procedures stipulated by Part V of the ConstitutionAct, 19824 for the
passage of constitutional amendments. Those procedures involve
ratification by the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the
provinces. In the case of the Charlottetown Accord, the unanimity
procedure of section 41 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 was the applicable
one (because the proposals included changes to the amending

1 The referendum was a national one, held under the authority of federal law everywhere
except in Quebec, where the referendum was a provincial one held under the authority of provincial
law: see infra notes 14 and 15. Technically, there were two referendums, but they were held at the
same time on the same question, and the results were amalgamated into national figures.
2

Referendum 92:- Official Voting Results (Ottawa: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 1992) at
ix [hereinafter Referendum 92]; and Rapport des rdsultats officiels du scrutin: rifirendum du 26
octobre 1992 (Qudbec: Directeur g6n6ral des 6lections du Qu6bec, 1992) at 23 [hereinafter Rapport
921.
3 The Accord, which was not in the form of a legal text, but a draft legal text, prepared by
officials, was issued on 9 October 1992. The text of the Accord and the draft legal text is set out in
the appendices to K. McRoberts & PJ. Monahan, eds., The CharlottetownAccord, the Referendum,
and the Futureof Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
4 Being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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procedures), so that all eleven legislative bodies would have had to pass
ratifying resolutions in order to convert the Accord into law. The reason
the Charlottetown Accord was submitted to a national referendum was
because the first ministers and leaders at Charlottetown agreed to take
this step. This was a radical break with past practice-no previous
amendment had been submitted to popular vote-and it was driven by
widespread public discontent with "deals" made by politicians. Despite
unprecedented public consultations for twelve months prior to the
Accord, 5 the final stage of reaching agreement inevitably turned into a
prolonged, closed-door session of bargaining by the seventeen
participants. It was felt that, in order to give legitimacy to the Accord,
its approval by popular vote was necessary. This feeling was reinforced
by the fact that several provinces, including Quebec, were committed by
statute to submitting proposals for constitutional amendment to
provincial referendums.
The referendum was decisively lost. The "no" side prevailed by a
national majority of 54.4 per cent to 44.6 per cent. 6 The "no" side7
prevailed in six of the ten provinces, including the province of Quebec.
The referendum result spelt the end of the Charlottetown Accord, which
never even started the process of ratification by the Parliament and the
legislatures. The referendum result, following as it did the failure by the
legislative bodies to ratify the Meech Lake Accord of 1987,8 also brought
to an end the process of seeking constitutional change. Not only had all
the political actors become weary of the long, strenuous process, it had
become clear that for the immediate future at least, it was impossible to
design a package of amendments that could command popular support
in all regions of the country.

5 The Preface to the Charlottetown Accord, supra note 3, describes the committee hearings
and reports, the six national conferences, and the prolonged meetings of the seventeen federal,
provincial, territorial, and Aboriginal delegations that preceded the Accord.
6 M. Cemetig, "Result a unique measure of societal boundaries, analysts say" The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (28 October 1992) A4 at A4. See also Referendum 92, supra note 2 at 4, which
reports that 54.3 per cent of Canada, excluding Quebec, voted "no" and 45.7 per cent voted "yes";
and Rapport 92, supra note 2 at 49, which reports that 56.68 per cent of Quebec voted "no" and
43.32 per cent voted "yes."
7 Although the vote in Quebec was similar to the vote in the rest of Canada, the reasons for
the vote were quite different. Outside Quebec, there was a widespread sentiment that Quebec had
been given too much. Inside Quebec, the prevailing sentiment among French speakers was that
Quebec had not been given enough!
8 p.j. Monahan, Meech Lake: The Inside Story (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991)
App. 3.
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II. THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD
The Charlottetown Accord was an attempt to resolve a number
of tensions that had developed within Canada as the result of the size
and diversity of the country.
The most important tension was nationalist sentiment in the
province of Quebec. It was the most important because it had the
capacity to break up the country. The Accord tried to satisfy Quebec
with, among other things, a clause recognizing Quebec as a distinct
society (clause 1); the expansion of the unanimity requirement for
constitutional amendments (clause 57), which would give each province
a veto; a guarantee of 25 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons
(clause 57); and the devolution to the provinces of some federal powers
(Part 3).
Another tension was caused by "western alienation," which is the
sense that the interests of the western provinces have usually been
subordinated to the interests of central Canada, where the bulk of the
population lives (and votes). The Accord tried to satisfy western
Canadians with an elected Senate (clause 7) in which each province
would have an equal number of members (clause 8).
Another tension was caused by Aboriginal people. A primary
step in the solution to their current state of deprivation is selfgovernment. The Accord included a recognition that the Aboriginal
peoples had an inherent right of self-government within Canada (clause
41), as well as provisions for making that right a reality through
agreements with the other levels of government (clauses 45, 46, and 50).
In addition to the three constituencies mentioned, namely,
Quebec, the West, and Aboriginal peoples, the constitutional discussions
were affected by the views of many other groups, who used the various
opportunities for participation to make constitutional demands.
Business associations, trade unions, minority language speakers,
women's groups, and many others all campaigned actively to place their
political objectives on the nation's constitutional agenda. The
Charlottetown Accord tried to accommodate their various (and often
contradictory) claims with the Canada Clause (clause 1) and the Social
and Economic Charter (clause 4). The anodyne provisions of these parts
of the Accord succeeded in pleasing very few people.
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III. QUEBEC
A. The Searchfor an Accommodation
Quebec, with its French language and culture, its civil law, and
its distinctive institutions, is not a province like the others. The
accommodation of Quebec within Canada has always been the driving
force behind the various constitutional arrangements of the settlements
of the St. Lawrence valley. A variety of accommodations can be traced
from the time of the British victory on the Plains of Abraham, which was
formalized by The Royal Proclamation,1763.9 These have been: The
Quebec Act, 1774,10 which restored the French civil law; The
ConstitutionalAct,1791,11 which divided Quebec into Upper and Lower
Canada; The Union Act, 1840,12 which reunited the two Canadas; and
The British North America Act, 1867,13 which established a federal
government and recreated a separate province in the territory of
Quebec. It is the last arrangement that has lasted the longest by far,
because it has enabled the French language and culture to survive and
flourish in Quebec, within Canada, which is one of the most prosperous
countries in the world. To an outside observer, it is hard to see what is
wrong.
Nonetheless, the last two decades have seen an intensive effort
to redefine the role of Quebec in the Canadian federation. In order to
understand why, it is necessary to travel back to the constitutional
settlement of 1982. That settlement was a major achievement, curing
several long-standing defects in the Constitution of Canada. The
Canada Act 198214 terminated the power of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom over Canada. The ConstitutionAct, 1982, which was a
schedule to the Canada Act, introduced new amending procedures,
which could be operated without recourse to the United Kingdom. As
well as the adoption of domestic amending procedures (sections 38-49),

9 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. H, No. 1.
10 (U.K), 14 Geo. 3, c. 83, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 2.
11 (U.K.), 31 Geo. 3, c. 31, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 3.
12 (U.K.), 3 & 4 Vict., c. 35, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 4.
13

ConstitutionAct,1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (formerlyButishNorth America Act, 1867).

14 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter CanadaAct].
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a charter of rights was adopted (sections 1-34),15 Aboriginal rights were
recognized (section 35), equalization grants were guaranteed (section
36), provincial powers over natural resources were extended (sections 50
and 51), and the Constitution of Canada was defined and given
supremacy over other laws (section 52). But the Constitution Act, 1982
signally failed to accomplish one of the goals of constitutional reform:
the better accommodation of Quebec within the Canadian federation.
The Premier of Quebec had been the sole dissenter to the
constitutional settlement of 1982; the Quebec National Assembly had
passed a resolution condemning the settlement; and Quebec had even
sought relief in the courts, though without success. 16 Nor were Quebec's
concerns without substance. The new amending procedures denied a
veto to Quebec, something that in the past had always been recognized
in practice. The new Charterof Rights restricted the powers of the
provincial legislatures, and, in particular, limited the capacity of the
Quebec National Assembly to implement French language policy. 17
Thus, the outcome of the constitutional changes of 1982 was a
diminution of Quebec's powers and a profound sense of grievance in the
province.
In assessing the gravity of Quebec's alienation resulting from the
constitutional changes of 1982, it is important to cast one's mind back
two further years to Quebec's referendum on sovereignty association,
which was held by the Parti Qu6b6cois government on 20 May 1980.
The referendum was defeated by a popular vote of 59.5 per cent to 40.5
per cent.18 In the referendum campaign, the federalist forces promised
that a "no" to sovereignty association was not a vote for the status quo,
and the defeat of the referendum would be followed by constitutional
change to better accommodate Quebec's aspirations. The defeat of the
referendum was in fact immediately followed by a series of federalprovincial conferences in the summer and early fall of 1980, but these
conferences failed to yield agreement on the specifics of constitutional

15 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the CanadaAct1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charterof Rights].
16
Re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793.
17

This concern was shown to be justified by the later decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Quebec (A.G.) v. Quebec Association of ProtestantSchool Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66
(striking down Quebec's restrictions on admission to English-language schools) and Ford v. Quebec
(A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (striking down Quebec's prohibition of English-language commercial
signs).
18
Rapport des rsultatsofficiels du scuti: rifirendum du 20 mai 1980 (Quebec: Assembide
nationale du Qu6bec, 1980) at 19.
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change. On 6 October 1980, despite the absence of a federal-provincial
agreement, Prime Minister Trudeau introduced in the House of
Commons a resolution calling for the set of constitutional amendments
that, after substantial alteration, became the CanadaAct 1982 and the
Constitution Act, 1982. For the reasons explained in the previous
paragraph, these 1982 changes did not fulfil the promises made during
the 1980 referendum campaign in Quebec.
Quebec was of course legally bound by the ConstitutionAct, 1982
because theAct had been adopted into law by the correct constitutional
procedures. However, the government of Quebec thereafter refused to
participate in constitutional changes that involved the new amending
procedures. And the government opted out of the new Charterof Rights
to the maximum extent 19
possible under section 33 by introducing a
"notwithstanding clause"
into each of its existing statutes and into
°
every newly-enacted statute? In these ways, the point was made that
the ConstitutionAct, 1982 lacked political legitimacy in the province of
Quebec.
B. The Meech Lake Accord
In 1984, Prime Minister Trudeau resigned, and, after an election
later in the year, the Progressive Conservative government of Prime
Minister Mulroney took office. One of the new government's policies
was to achieve a reconciliation with Quebec. In 1985, an election was
held in Quebec, and the Parti Qu6brcois government was defeated. The
new Liberal government of Premier Bourassa moved to seek a
reconciliation with the rest of Canada. The government announced five
conditions that were required for Quebec's acceptance of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982. These were: (1) the recognition of Quebec as a
distinct society, (2) a greater role in immigration, (3) a provincial role in
appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, (4) limitations on the
federal spending power, and (5) a veto for Quebec on constitutional
amendments 2 1
19 Section 33 enables the Parliament or a provincial legislature to override most of the
provisions of the CharterofRights by including a provision in a statute declaring that the statute is to
operate notwithstandinga particular provision of the CharterofRights.
20 Bill 62, An Act respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, 3d Sess., 32d Leg., Quebec, 1982
(assented to 23 June 1982, S.Q. 1982, c. 21).

21 SeeA Quebec Free to Choose: Report of the ConstitutionalCommittee of the QudbecLiberal
Party (Quebec: Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party, 1991) (Chair: J. Allaire) at
12 [hereinafter Allaire Report]; and Report of the Commission on the Politicaland Constitutional
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The Prime Minister and the other provincial Premiers agreed to
negotiate on Quebec's five conditions. The outcome of those
negotiations was the Meech Lake Accord of 1987, which was an
agreement entered into by all eleven first ministers on a set of
amendments, essentially giving effect to Quebec's five conditions. This
seemed at the time to be an immensely important development,
reconciling the government of Quebec to the Constitution Act, 1982.
However, in order to become law, the Accord had to be ratified by
resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the legislative
assembly of every province.22 It was ratified by the Senate and House of
Commons23 and by eight of the ten provinces, but it was not ratified by
all ten provinces.2 4 The Accord, therefore, lapsed. A unique
opportunity to resolve a serious political problem was thus squandered.
C. The CharlottetownAccord
The lapse of the Meech Lake Accord caused great
disappointment in the province of Quebec because it seemed to indicate
that the rest of Canada was unwilling to make any accommodation to
Quebec. This caused an increase in nationalist sentiment in the
province. That change in public opinion was reflected in the Allaire
Report, which was a report of the Constitutional Committee of the
That Report called for a radical
Quebec Liberal Party.2 5
Future of Quebec (Quebec: Commission sur l'avenir politique et constitutionnel du Qudbec, 1991)
(Co-Chairs: M. B61anger & J. Campeau) at 31-32 [hereinafter Bdlanger-Campeau Report].

22 The unanimity procedure of section 41 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 was applicable because
the Accord included provisions relating to the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada
(section 41(d)) and a change in the amending procedures (section 41(e)).
23 The Senate actually refused to ratify it, but was overridden by the House of Commons

under section 47 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982.
24 The government of New Brunswick changed in 1987 before ratification, and the new
Liberal government of Premier McKenna refused to ratify the Accord. The same thing happened in
Manitoba in 1988, and the new Progressive Conservative government of Premier Filmon refused to

ratify the Accord. The government of Newfoundland changed in 1989 after ratification, and the
new Liberal government of Premier Wells acted under section 46(2) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 to

revoke the previous ratification. In an attempt to bring the dissenters on board, a companion
accord was agreed to by the First Ministers in Ottawa on 6 June 1990, which proposed some
changes to the original Accord. This was followed by New Brunswick's ratification, but the

legislative assemblies of Manitoba and Newfoundland adjourned without bringing the issue to a
vote by 23 June 1990. Section 39(2) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 caused the process to lapse'on that

date, which was three years from 'the date of the first legislative ratification, which had been by
Quebec on 23 June 1987.
25

Supra note 21.
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decentralization of the Canadian federation, a reduction in the power
and size of the federal government, the elimination of appeals from the
Quebec courts to the Supreme Court of Canada, a veto for Quebec over
constitutional amendments, and the abolition of the Senate. The Report
called for a referendum "before the winter of 1992"26 for the purpose of
ratifying a constitutional agreement with the rest of Canada. If no
constitutional agreement had been reached by that time, the referendum
would still be held, but would instead be used for the purpose of
ratifying "Quebec's assumption of sovereign statehood" along with "an
offer to form an economic union with the rest of Canada. ''27 The Allaire
Report was greeted with disbelief outside Quebec, but on 10 March
1991, it was adopted with minor amendments as policy by the convention
of the Quebec Liberal Party. 28
A second report, by a committee of Quebec's National
Assembly, came out after the Allaire Report. The B61anger-Campeau
Report recommended that "a referendum on Quebec sovereignty" be
held in the summer or fall of 1992.29 It also recommended the
establishment of a special parliamentary commission with the duty to
"assess any offer of a new partnership of a constitutional nature made by
the Government of Canada, and to make recommendations in this
respect to the National Assembly." 30 The Report made no suggestions
as to what that "new partnership" might look like, and indeed made no
recommendations for constitutional change, although it repeatedly
asserted that radical change was necessary.
In compliance with the two Quebec reports, the Quebec
National Assembly in 1991 enacted a statute that required a referendum
"on the sovereignty of Quebec" to be held no later than 26 October
1992.3 1 The date of 26 October 1992 became the deadline for the
constitutional discussions that followed, as the rest of Canada
confronted for a second time since 1980 the possibility that Quebec
would vote in a popular referendum to secede from the Canadian
26

ibid. at 46.

27

Parti Lib6ral du Qu6bec, News Release 91/30, "Highlights of the Constitutional Proposal of

the Qu6bec Liberal Party" (29 January 1991).
28 p. Poirier, "Anglo Liberals back Bourassa" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (11 March 1991)
A3; and R. S6guin, "Canada first choice of Liberals, Bourassa says: Leader struggles for unity
despite sovereigntist plan" The [Toronto] Globe andMail (11 March 1991) Al at A2.
29

Supra note 21 at 80.

30

Ibid. at 81.

31 Bill 150, An Act respectingthe processfor determining thepolitical and constitutionalfuture of
Quebec, 1st Sess., 34th Leg., Quebec, 1991 (assented to 20 June 1991, S.Q. 1991, c. 34).
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federation. It was obviously essential that there be a federalist
constitutional proposal available by the time Quebeckers voted on 26
October 1992. As related above, the Charlottetown Accord was reached
on 28 August 1992. Quebec immediately enacted an amendment to its
referendum statute to change the topic of the referendum from "the
sovereignty of Quebec" to "the agreement concerning the new
constitutional partnership resulting from the meetings on the
constitution held in August 1992."32 The Quebec referendum was held
on 26 October 1992. On the same day, a federal referendum was held in
the rest of the country. Both referendums asked the same question,
namely, "Do you agree that the Constitution of Canada should be
renewed on the basis of the agreement reached on August 28,
1992?" 33
As related above, the Charlottetown Accord was
decisively defeated in the referendum vote, both in Quebec and in the
rest of Canada.
The Accord had proposed basically the same set of changes as
the Meech Lake Accord, as well as a permanent guarantee to Quebec of
25 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons (even if the province's
population eventually fell below 25 per cent of the country's total)
(clause 21(a)), and the devolution to the provinces of some federal
powers. Evidently, these proposals were not enough to satisfy the
majority of Quebec voters. The unfortunate result is that no change was
made in the Constitution. Although the referendum (and the recession)
seem to have taken the steam out of nationalist sentiment in Quebec for
the time being, when the issue of secession arises again, Quebeckers will
have to choose between the present Constitution and secession. They
cannot have the halfway house that was designed for them at
Charlottetown. The "no" vote in the referendum has made the
independence option relatively more attractive.
D. Prognosis
Will Quebec eventually decide to secede? It is very hard to
predict political events, but it is surely relevant to notice that Quebec has
been remarkably successful in promoting the French language and
culture, and in building a sound economy. In addition, Quebec has been
32 Bill 44, An Act to amend the Act respecting the process for determining the political and
constitutional future of Quebec, 2d Sess., 34th Leg., Quebec, 1992, (assented to 8 September 1992,
S.Q., 1992, c. 47).
33 Supra note 2.
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very successful in asserting its influence within the federal government 3 4
All this has been accomplished within the framework of the present
Constitution. From a practical point of view, it is difficult to see what
Quebeckers would gain by secession, and it seems undeniable that
secession would have adverse economic consequences, for Quebec
especially but also for the rest of Canada. One is entitled to hope that
prudence and pragmatism will rule the day and will keep Quebec within
Canada.
IV. THE WEST
A. DistinctiveEconomy
A second force of constitutional change is western regionalism.
This is based not on a distinctive language or culture, but on the
distinctive economic base of the four western provinces. Their
economies depend upon the primary production of grain, wood, metals,
oil, gas, and other minerals. Because the bulk of Canada's population is
concentrated in Ontario and Quebec, federal policies have tended to
favour the manufacturing industries and consumers of central Canada.
This tendency has been reflected in the tariffs that protect domestic
manufacturing and in transportation and energy-pricing policies, for
example. The Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister
Mulroney, which came to power in 1984, moved to deal with the
principal complaints by entering into a Free Trade Agreement with the
United States, abolishing the National Energy Program, liberalizing the
controls on foreign investment, and subjecting transportation and energy
prices to the market. These changes reflect a westerly shift in political
power caused by the steady growth in population and wealth of the
western provinces. The population growth means that the western
provinces now have more seats in the House of Commons than Quebec.
As for wealth, Alberta is far and away the wealthiest of the ten provinces
on a revenue per capita basis, and British Columbia ranks third after
Ontario.35

34
Both Liberal Prime Minister Trudeau (1968-79 and 1980-84) and Progressive Conservative
Prime Minister Mulroney (1984-93) came from Quebec and were elected with strong majorities in
Quebec.

35 The NationalFinances 1992 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1992) at 16:21.
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B. Senate Reform
The constitutional dimension of western regionalism has taken
the form of advocacy of Senate reform. Because the population of the
West is still greatly outnumbered by central Canada, it is inevitable that
the House of Commons, composed as it is on the basis of representation
by population, will tend to favour the interests of central Canada. The
solution is a "triple-E Senate," which would be equal, elected, and
effective. The composition of the triple-E Senate would be based on the
equality of the provinces; each province would be represented by the
same number of senators. The senators would be elected; they would
therefore have a political mandate to exercise real power. And, the
Constitution would confer real power on the Senate so that it would
become an effective part of the legislative process.
The argument for a triple-E Senate is that the elected senators
would vote to protect the interests of their province or region. That
does not happen now, it is said, because the senators are appointed by
the federal government. The trouble with the argument is that the
representation of states or regions also does not occur in Australia,
which has a triple-E Senate. The Senate in Australia consistently votes
on party lines. The party affiliation that enabled each senator to become
elected overwhelmingly dominates regional considerations. It is true
that the Australian experience might not be replicated in Canada, but it
is hard to see why not. In Canada, as in Australia, the political parties
are accustomed to insisting upon and obtaining from their members
strict loyalty to the party's legislative programme, even if (as is
occasionally inevitable) the programme has adverse effects in some
regions. Party discipline is insisted upon and obtained because it is the
key to the operation of responsible parliamentary government. It is not
required, and does not exist, in the presidential system of government, so
that the functioning of the triple-E Senate of the United States has no
predictive value for a triple-E Senate in Canada.
If a Canadian triple-E Senate were to become simply a party
House, it would be an institution of little value. When its party majority
was the same as that of the House of Commons it would offer little or no
resistance to the government's legislative programme. When the
Senate's majority was controlled by the opposition party, it would
oppose much of the government's legislative programme. Indeed,
differences of opinion between the two Houses could lead to the
stultification of the government's ability to govern, since they could
extend even to the granting of supply. It was the refusal of the
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Australian Senate to grant supply to Prime Minister Whitlam in 1975
that caused the Governor General to dismiss the Prime Minister, even
though he had a safe majority in the House of Commons. In his place,
the Governor General installed a Prime Minister who could not
command a majority in the House of Commons, and whose only role was
to act as a caretaker until an election could be called. 36
C. The CharlottetownAccord
The Charlottetown Accord proposed that the Senate be an
elected body (clause 7),37with equal representation from each province
(clause 8). There would be sixty-two senators, six from each province
and one from each territory.38 Elections would be held at the same time
as elections to the House of Commons. The Senate would not be a
confidence chamber, so that the defeat of a government bill would not
entail the resignation of the government (clause 10). The Senate would
have no power to block supply bills (clause 13). The defeat of most
other bills would trigger a joint sitting with the (more numerous) House
of Commons, and the fate of the bill would be determined by the
majority vote at the joint sitting (clause 12). In these ways, the Accord
sought to moderate conflict between the two Houses and to preserve the
supremacy of the House of Commons.
D. Prognosis
The defeat of the Charlottetown Accord spelt the end of the
triple-E Senate idea because Senate reform requires an amendment to
the Constitution. Is this a problem? As in the case of Quebec, it is
possible to take an optimistic line. The growth in the population of the
western provinces and their increasing relative wealth is causing a steady
36 Of the vast literature on the Australian crisis, reference may be made to G. Sawer,
Federation under strain: Australia, 1972-1975 (Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press,
1977); G. Evans, ed., Labour and the Constitution 1972-1975 (1977); J. Kerr, Mattersfor Judgment
(Melbourne: MacMillan, 1978) (the Governor General's version); E.G. Whitlam, The Truth of the
Matter (London: Allen Lane, 1979) (the Prime Minister's version); G. Barwick, SirJohn did his duty
(Wahroonga, Australia: Serendip Publishing, 1983) (the Chief Justice's version).

37 It was proposed that the senators be elected, either by the population of the province or by
the members of the legislative assembly. The latter option is really appointment by the provincial
government.
38 Separate Aboriginal representation was also contemplated (clause 9).
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westward shift of political power. Indeed, as related above, traditional
western grievances respecting tariffs, freight rates, and energy prices
have already been dealt with-without a triple-E Senate. It seems likely
that the West will continue to be successful in asserting its influence in
the development of public policies without the aid of a triple-E Senate.
V. ABORIGINAL PEOPLE
A. Entrenchment of Rights
A third force of constitutional change is the demand by the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada-the Indian, Inuit, and M6tis
peoples-for constitutional recognition of their traditional rights.
The Aboriginal peoples made some important constitutional
gains in the ConstitutionAct, 1982. Section 35(1) of the Act declared
that "[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples
of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed." Initially, it was not
entirely clear what this meant (which may have helped the governments
to agree to it). However, in R. v. Sparrow,3 9 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that section 35(1) was an effective protection of Aboriginal
rights. 40 The effect of section 35, the Court held, was to invalidate
legislation that had the effect of extinguishing or abridging an Aboriginal
or treaty right. Section 35 did not revive rights that had been
extinguished validly before 1982, but a valid extinguishment involved a
"clear and plain" intention to extinguish 4 1 The mere fact that an
aboriginal right-in this case, the right to fish-was extensively regulated
in 1982 did not mean that the right had been extinguished, not even
partially extinguished to the extent of the regulation.
The Sparrow decision does not mean that all regulation in
existence in 1982 (and all future regulation) is necessarily invalid.
Because section 35 is not part of the Charterof Rights, it is not subject to
section 1 of the Charterof Rights, which specifies that Charterrights are
not absolute, but are subject to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 42
However, the Court in Sparrow held that Aboriginal rights were not
39 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafterSparrow].
40
41
42

1bid. at 1105.
bi. at 1091 and at 1099.
Supra note 15.
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absolute either. They were subject to regulation by federal law, provided
the federal law could satisfy a standard of justification not unlike that
erected by the Court for section 1 of the Charter.43 In particular, the
federal law would have to serve a "compelling and substantial" objective,
such as the conservation of a resource, and the law would have to impair
the Aboriginal right as little as possible, for example, by giving priority to
Aboriginal harvesters. 44
B. Definition of Rights
The Court in Sparrow found that Mr. Sparrow was exercising an
existing Aboriginal right to fish for salmon in the mouth of the Fraser
River, because he "was fishing in ancient tribal territory where his
ancestors had fished from time immemorial. '45 This confirmed that
Aboriginal people are indeed entitled to rights arising out of their long
possession of lands prior to European settlement. Moreover, the Court
said that section 35 guaranteed those rights "in a contemporary form
rather than in their primeval simplicity and vigour. ''46 This confirmed
that Aboriginal rights had evolved to take advantage of the progress of
technology: for example, the steel hook, the gun, the mechanical trap,
and the use of money were all included in modem Aboriginal rights.
This was all significant, but Sparrow said very little about the
identification and definition of Aboriginal rights; and, indeed, said very
little about what would satisfy the "clear and plain" rule for
extinguishment. In that sense, Aboriginal rights remain dependent upon
the unpredictable decisions of courts.
One solution to the problem of identifying and defining
Aboriginal rights is an amendment to the Constitution clarifying the
meaning of existing Aboriginal rights in section 35. That task was in fact
contemplated by the Constitution Act, 1982, section 37 of which required
that a constitutional conference of the first ministers and representatives
of Aboriginal peoples be convened to consider "the identification and
definition of the rights of those peoples to be included in the
Constitution of Canada." That conference was held in 1983 and those

43
44
45
46

lbid. at 1109.
Lbid.
at 1113 and at 1119.
id. at 1095.

Ibid. at 1093 quoting from B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can.
Bar Rev. 727 at 782.
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attending it did agree upon some clarifications to section 35, and, in
particular, that modem land claims agreements were to count as treaties
for the purpose of the section 35 guarantee. They also agreed that the
process should continue in at least two additional constitutional
a
conferences. These products of the 1983 conference were embodied in47
formula.
seven-fifty
the
by
enacted
was
that
constitutional resolution
In fact, all legislative bodies passed the resolution except for Quebec,
which was boycotting the constitutional amending process to which it
had never agreed.
The two additional conferences that were now mandated by the
new section 37.1 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 were also held in April,
1985 and March, 1987 and the participants struggled with the proposal
of expressly including in section 35 the right of Aboriginal selfgovernment. That task proved to be too difficult and they failed to agree
on a resolution for a constitutional amendment. There did not seem to
be disagreement on the idea of entrenching Aboriginal self-government.
Nor was there disagreement on the idea that the precise forms and
structures of each government would vary from one Aboriginal
community to another, and would need to be negotiated with the two
levels of government by each Aboriginal community. It seems fair to say
that considerable progress was made on the issue of recognizing a right
of Aboriginal self-government.
However, the drafting problems proved insuperable. The
Aboriginal leaders could not accept language that implied that
Aboriginal self-government was contingent upon the governments
entering into self-government agreements. Such language would suggest
that self-government was not one of the existing Aboriginal rights
already protected by section 35. On the other hand, the recognition of
an inherent, free-standing right of self-government could lead to judicial
enforcement, which might involve the creation by the courts of
Aboriginal political structures that had not been agreed to by the people
who would come under the new political authority. In addition to this
basic problem of definition, it was difficult to settle in advance the
relationship between the institutions of Aboriginal self-government and
the other parts of the Constitution of Canada, especially the federal
legislative power over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians"
(section 91(24)) and the Charterof Rights.

47

The ConstitutionAmendment Proclamation,1983, SI/84-102, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App.
II, No. 46, added subsections (3) and (4) to section 35, as well as replacing section 25(b) and adding
subsections 35.1 and 37.1 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982.
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After the failure of the last Aboriginal rights conference in
March, 1987, the first ministers became totally preoccupied with the
Meech Lake Accord and its ratification. This pushed Aboriginal rights
off the constitutional agenda, and caused most Aboriginal groups to
oppose the Accord. They did so although clause 16 of the Accord
expressly affirmed that the new distinct society clause did not affect any
of the provisions of the Constitution concerned with Aboriginal rights.
This clause made clear that the Accord did not worsen the constitutional
status of Aboriginal peoples. Of course it was reasonable to expect that
if the Quebec round were successfully completed, the issue of Aboriginal
self-government would resume its place on the constitutional agenda.
However, Aboriginal leaders were so frustrated by the deferral of their
aspirations in favour of those of Quebec that they played a prominent
role in the defeat of the Meech Lake Accord.
C. Land ClaimsAgreements
Although Sparrow concerned Aboriginal rights, it is clear from
the language of section 35 that treaty rights possess the same guaranteed
status. Moreover, treaty rights possess the inestimable advantage that
they are written down in black and white, and do not suffer from the
uncertainty of Aboriginal rights. Furthermore, section 35, since its
amendment in 1983, expressly states that rights acquired under modern
"land claims agreements" are treaty rights within section 35. In Sparrow,
the Court commented that section 35 "provides a solid constitutional
base upon which subsequent negotiations can take place." 48 This was, I
think, a realistic acknowledgement that aboriginal rights are best
clarified, confirmed, and brought up-to-date by the negotiation of land
claims agreements. The terms of such agreements then become treaty
rights that are constitutionally protected by section 35.
Many Aboriginal people already have treaty rights of varying
degrees of comprehensiveness. In the 1700s, in eastern Canada, treaties
of peace and friendship were entered into with the Indian nations, but
these did not typically involve the cession by the Indians of their lands.
As European settlement proceeded westward, a series of numbered
treaties were entered into with the Indian nations. These treaties, which
cover a large part of Canada in Ontario and the prairie provinces, on
their face do cede land to the Crown in return for promises of
protection, assistance, and hunting and fishing rights, and the
48

Supra note 39 at 1105.
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reservation of portions of the treaty lands for the Indians. There are still
specific land claims by Aboriginal peoples in the treaty areas, but these
claims are based on treaty promises that have not been fulfilled rather
than on Aboriginal rights.
By the 1920s, when the last of the numbered treaties had been
entered into, there remained vast areas of Canada where no treaty
making had taken place. These included Inuit lands in Labrador,
northern Quebec and the Northwest Territories, and Indian lands in
British Columbia, the Yukon, and the Northwest Territories. As to
these lands, the federal government, supported by the provinces, took
the position that the Aboriginal peoples had no title, and there was no
need to enter into treaties with them. This policy changed after the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v. British Columbia
(A.G.). 49 In that case, six of the seven judges held that the Nishga
people of British Columbia possessed Aboriginal rights to their lands
that had survived European settlement. The six judges, however, split
evenly on the question of whether those rights had been extinguished or
not. After Calder, the federal government resumed the treaty-making
process in the regions of Canada where there were no treaties.
At the time of writing (1993), comprehensive land claims have
been settled with the Inuit and Cree of the James Bay area of northern
Quebec, the Inuvialuit of the Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort sea region, the
Gwich'in of the western Northwest Territories, the Inuit of the Nunavut
region in the eastern Northwest Territories, and the Yukon Indians.
These agreements grant large areas of land to the Aboriginal signatories,
as well as considerable sums of money. In addition, however, the
agreements constitute sophisticated codes with respect to such matters
as development, land use planning, water management, fish and wildlife
harvesting, forestry, and mining. The general governmental structures
that are contemplated by these codes contain guaranteed representation
for the Aboriginal people, who are thereby assured a continuing role in
the management of the resources of the entire region covered by the
agreement, not just their own settlement land.
D. Self-government
The comprehensive land claims process would seem to be the
ideal forum for the definition of the right of self-government of the
claimant group. Initially, however, the federal government felt
49 [1973] S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter Calder].
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committed to the constitutional amending process (described above) as
the exclusive vehicle for the entrenchment of rights of self-government.
Now, the federal government is willing to negotiate self-government
agreements as part of the comprehensive land claims process, with the
important proviso that such agreements are not to be regarded as giving
rise to section 35 treaty rights. The federal government's concern, no
doubt, is not to preempt the constitutional amendment process in which
the provinces would be participants along with the Aboriginal
organizations.
E. Participationin the Amending Process
This brings me to my final point, which is the constitutional
amending process itself. As noted in the previous paragraph,
constitutional amendments, by their very nature, can alter the
constitution itself and everything else, including Aboriginal and treaty
rights. In the past, constitutional amendments have had the effect of
altering Indian treaty rights.5 0 It seems essential, therefore, that
Aboriginal peoples be participants in the amending process when their
interests are implicated. For example, the accession to provincial status
of the federal territories could inadvertently impair rights acquired
under land claims agreements if Aboriginal interests were not being
watched carefully.51
F. The CharlottetownAccord
The Charlottetown Accord proposed that the Constitution be
amended to recognize explicitly "that the Aboriginal peoples of Canada
have the inherent right of self-government within Canada" (clause 41).
This inherent right was to be non-justiciable for a period of five years
(clause 42) during which (as well as afterwards) the federal and
provincial governments were committed to the negotiation of self50

R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 at 938-39 and The Constitution Act, 1930 (U.K.), 20 &

21 Geo. V, c. 26, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 26, had extinguished a treaty right to hunt
commercially.

51 An important step in this direction was taken in 1983, when section 35.1 was added to the
ConstitutionAct, 1982 by section 3 of the ConstitutionAmendment Proclamation,1983, supra note

46. In section 35.1, Canadian governments are said to be "committed to the principle" that there be
Aboriginal participation in constitutional conferences before amendments are made to the

specifically Aboriginal provisions of the Constitution.
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government agreements. The self-government agreements would be
justiciable and would create treaty rights that were protected by section
35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 (clause 46). The Charterof Rights would
apply to the institutions of self-government (clause 43).
With respect to future constitutional amendments, the Accord
proposed that aboriginal consent would be required to those
amendments "that directly refer to the Aboriginal peoples" (clause 60).
G. Prognosis
The failure of the Charlottetown Accord was a serious set back
for the movement towards Aboriginal self-government. However, that
movement can and will continue within the framework of the present
Constitution. Self-government agreements are now being negotiated by
several Aboriginal nations, and there is no reason other than current
federal government policy why the agreements, which are modern
treaties, cannot have the constitutional protection of section 35 of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982. No amendment of the Constitution is needed to
set up Aboriginal governments, nor to give them constitutional
protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Charlottetown Accord was an ambitious attempt to achieve
a national settlement of a variety of constitutional grievances, and
especially those arising from Quebec nationalism, western alienation,
and Aboriginal deprivation. As is the nature of any settlement, the
federal, provincial, territorial, and Aboriginal leaders accepted the need
for compromise, and the Accord gave no leader all that he or she would
have desired. When the leaders turned to the hustings to defend their
handiwork in the national referendum, they were unsuccessful in
persuading a majority of the people of the need for reconciliation and
compromise. Those opposed to the Accord were more successful in
characterizing the Accord's compromises as faults, and in questioning
the need for comprehensive constitutional renewal.
The thesis of this paper has been that, without constitutional
amendment, Canada can function reasonably effectively to deal with the
grievances that gave rise to the Charlottetown Accord. One should also
take comfort from the fact that it is always difficult to amend a country's
constitution. Machiavelli, writing in 1513, said "there is no more
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delicate matter to take in hand, nor more dangerous to conduct, nor
more doubtful in its success, than to set up as a leader in the
introduction of changes [to the constitution]."5 2 Machiavelli would not
have been surprised by the referendum result.

52

N. Machiavelli, The Prince (1513) (New York: Book-of-the-Month Club, 1992) at 21.

